A recent trend in object oriented (OO) programming languages is the use of Access Permissions (APs) as an abstraction for controlling concurrent executions of programs. The use of AP source code annotations defines a protocol specifying how object references can access the mutable state of objects. Although the use of APs simplifies the task of writing concurrent code, an unsystematic use of them can lead to subtle problems. This paper presents a declarative interpretation of APs as Linear Concurrent Constraint Programs (lcc). We represent APs as constraints (i.e., formulas in logic) in an underlying constraint system whose entailment relation models the transformation rules of APs. Moreover, we use processes in lcc to model the dependencies imposed by APs, thus allowing the faithful representation of their flow in the program. We verify relevant properties about AP programs by taking advantage of the interpretation of lcc processes as formulas in Girard's intuitionistic linear logic (ILL). Properties include deadlock detection, program correctness (whether programs adhere to their AP specifications or not), and the ability of methods to run concurrently. By relying on a focusing discipline for ILL, we provide a complexity measure for proofs of the above mentioned properties. The effectiveness of our verification techniques is demonstrated by implementing the Alcove tool that includes an animator and a verifier. The former executes the lcc model, observing the flow of APs and quickly finding inconsistencies of the APs vis-à-vis the implementation. The latter is an automatic theorem prover based on ILL. This paper is under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
Introduction
Reasoning about concurrent programs is much harder than reasoning about sequential ones. Programmers often find themselves overwhelmed by the many subtle cases of thread interactions they must be aware of to decide whether a concurrent program is correct or not. In order to ensure program reliability, the programmer needs also to figure out the right level of thread atomicity to avoid race conditions, cope with mutual exclusion requirements and guarantee deadlock freeness.
All these problems are aggravated when software designers write programs using an object oriented (OO) language and use OO strategies to design their programs. In an OO program, objects can have multiple references (called aliases) that can modify local content concurrently. This significantly increases the complexity of the design of sound concurrent programs. For instance, data race conditions arise when two object references read and write concurrently from/to an object memory location. To cope with data races, one could simply place each object access within an atomic block, but this would affect negatively program performance. A better strategy could be to lock just the objects that are shared among threads. However, it then becomes hard to estimate which objects should be shared and which locations should be protected by locks just by looking at the program text.
Languages like AEminium (Stork et al. 2009 ), Plaid (Sunshine et al. 2011) and Mezzo (Pottier and Protzenko 2013) propose a strategy to design sound and reliable concurrent programs based on the concept of access permissions (APs) (Boyland et al. 2001) . APs are abstractions about the aliased access to an object content and they are annotated in the source code. They permit a direct control of the access to the mutable state of an object. Making explicit the access to a shared mutable state facilitates verification and enables parallelization of code. For instance, a unique AP, describing the case when only one reference to a given object exists, enforces absence of interference and simplifies verification; a shared AP, describing the case when an object may be accessed and modified by multiple references, allows for concurrent executions but makes verification trickier.
Although APs greatly help to devise static strategies for correct concurrent sharing of objects, the interactions resulting from dynamic bindings (e.g., aliasing of variables) might still lead to subtle difficulties. Indeed, it may happen that apparently correct permission assignments in simple programs lead to deadlocks.
We propose a Linear Concurrent Constraint Programming (lcc) (Fages et al. 2001) approach for the verification of AP annotated programs. Concurrent Constraint Programming (ccp) (Saraswat et al. 1991; Saraswat 1993 ) is a simple model for concurrency that extends and subsumes both Concurrent Logic Programming and Constraint Logic Programming. Agents in ccp interact by telling constraints (i.e., formulas in logic) into a shared store of partial information and synchronize by asking if a given information can be deduced from the store. In lcc, constraints are formulas in Girard's intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) (Girard 1987) and ask agents are allowed to consume tokens of information from the store.
We interpret AP programs as lcc agents that produce and consume APs when evolving. We use constraints to keep information about APs, object references, object fields, and method calls. Moreover, the constraint entailment relation allows us to verify compliance of methods and arguments to their AP signatures. The constraint system specifies also how the APs can be transformed during the execution of the program.
We are able to verify AP programs by exploiting the declarative view of lcc agents as formulas in ILL. The proposed program verification includes: (1) deadlock detection; (2) whether it is possible for methods to be executed concurrently or not; and (3) whether annotations adhere to the intended semantics associated with the flow of APs or not.
The key for this successful specification and analysis of AP annotations as ILL formulas is the use of a linear logic's focusing discipline (Andreoli 1992) . In fact, by using focusing we can identify which actions need to interact with the environment or not, either for choosing a path to follow, or for waiting for a guard to be available (e.g., the possession of an AP on a given object). This gives a method for measuring the complexity of focused ILL (ILLF) proofs in terms of actions, hence establishing an upper bound of the complexity for verifying the above mentioned properties. Moreover, as shown in (Olarte and Pimentel 2017) , focusing guarantees that the interpretation of lcc processes as ILL formulas is adequate at the highest level (full completeness of derivations): one step of computation (in lcc) corresponds to one step of logical reasoning. Hence, our encodings of AP annotations as ILL formulas is faithful w.r.t. the proposed lcc model.
The contributions of this work are three-fold: (1) the definition of a logical semantics for APs, (2) provision of a procedure for the verification of the above mentioned properties as well as a complexity analysis for it, and (3) the implementation of the verification approach as the Alcove tool (http://subsell.logic.at/alcove2/). The logical structure we impose on APs thus allows us to formally reason about the behavior of AP based programs and give a declarative account of the meaning of these annotations. It is worth noticing that we are not considering a specific AP based language. Instead, we give a logical meaning to the machinery of APs and type states (see Section 7) present in different languages. This allows us to provide static analyses independent of the runtime system at hand. For concreteness, we borrow the AP model of AEminium (Stork et al. 2009 ), a concurrent OO programming language based on the idea of APs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the syntax of the AP based language used here and Section 3 recalls lcc. Section 4 presents the interpretation of AP programs as lcc agents. We also show how the proposed model is a runnable specification that allows observing the flow of a program's permissions. We implemented this model as the Alcove LCC Animator explained in Section 4.3. Section 5 describes our approach to program verification and its implementation as the Alcove LL prover. It also presents a complexity analysis of the proposed verification. Two compelling examples of our framework are described in Section 6: the verification of a critical zone management system and a concurrent producer-consumer system. Section 7 concludes the paper.
A preliminary short version of this paper was published in (Olarte et al. 2012 ). The present paper gives many more examples and explanations and provides precise technical details. In particular, in this paper we identify the fragment of lcc (and ILL) required for the specification of AP programs and we show that this fragment allows for efficient verification techniques. Moreover, the language (and analyses) considered here take into account Data Group Permissions (Leino 1998; Stork et al. 2009 ), a powerful abstraction that adds application level dependencies without sacrificing concurrency (see Section 2.1).
Access Permissions in Object Oriented Programs
We start with an intuitive description of access permissions and data group access permissions. In Section 2.2, we give a formal account of them.
Access permissions (APs) are abstractions describing how objects are accessed. Assume a variable x that points to the object o. A unique permission to the reference x guarantees that x is the sole reference to object o. A shared permission provides x with reading and modifying access to o, which allows other references to o (called aliases) to exist and to read from it or to modify it. The immutable permission provides x with read-only access to o, and allows any other reference to o to exist and to read from it. Let us use a simple example to explain APs and the concurrency-by-default behavior (Stork et al. 2009 ) they offer. Figure 1 shows a program, taken and slightly modified from (Stork et al. 2009) , that operates over a collection of elements. Starting at line 8, the program creates an object of type collection at line 10 and an object of type stats at line 11. The program sorts the collection c at line 12, and prints it at line 13. It computes some statistics at line 14, and removes duplicates from the collection at line 15. Lines 3-7 declare the signatures for the methods. The constructor builds a unique reference to a new collection at line 3. Methods sort and removeDuplicates modify the content of the collection and they require a unique reference to it. Method compStats requires and returns an immutable (read-only) AP to the collection c and a unique AP to the parameter s. Given the AP signature of theses methods, the AP dataflow is computed where: (1) conflicting accesses are ordered according to the lexical order of the program; and (2) nonconflicting instructions can be executed concurrently. For instance, methods in lines 12 and 13 cannot be executed concurrently (since sort requires a unique permission ) and methods in lines 13 and 14 can be executed concurrently (since both methods require an immutable permission on c). Finally, the method in line 15 cannot be executed concurrently with compStats since removeDuplicates requires a unique AP. Hence, what we observe is that the unique permission returned by the constructor is consumed by the call of method sort. Once this method terminates, the unique permission can be split into two immutable permissions, and methods print and compStats can be executed concurrently. Once both methods have finished, the immutable APs are joined back into a unique AP, and the method removeDuplicates can be executed.
Share Permissions and Data Groups
As we just showed, unique permissions can be split into several immutable APs to allow multiple references to read, simultaneously, the state of an object. Therefore, from the AP annotations, the programming language can determine, automatically, the instructions that can be executed concurrently and those that need to be executed sequentially (Figure 1 ).
In the case of share APs, several references can modify concurrently the state of the same object. Hence, the programmer needs additional control structures to make explicit the parts of the code that can be executed concurrently. Consider for instance the following excerpt of code: 1 let Subject s, Observer o1, Observer o2 in where the constructor Observer as well as the method update require a share permission on s. Assume also that the intended behaviour of the program is that the method update should be executed only after the instantiation of the Observer objects.
If we were to handle share permissions as we did with immutable permissions in the previous section, once the new instance of Subject is created in line 2, the unique permission s has on it can be split into several share permissions. Hence, statements in lines 3 to 6 could be executed concurrently. This means that a possible run of the program may execute the method update in lines 5 and 6 before instantiating the Observers in lines 3 and 4, which does not comply with the intended behavior of the program.
Higher-level dependencies in AP programs can be defined by means of Data Groups (DGs) (Leino 1998) as in (Stork et al. 2009; Stork et al. 2014 ). Intuitively, a DG represents a collection of objects and it controls the flow of share permissions on them. For that, two kinds of Data Group Access Permissions (DGAPs) are defined: an atomic permission provides exclusive access to the DG, much like a unique AP for objects. Then, working on an atomic DGAP leads to the sequentialization of the code; on the contrary, a concurrent DGAP allows other DGAPs to coexist on the same DG. Therefore, a concurrent DGAP allows for the parallel execution of the code.
Consider the code in Figure 2 , taken and slightly modified (syntactically) from (Stork et al. 2009 ). In line 1, the class Subject is declared with a DG parameter dg. This parameter is similar to a type parameter (template) in modern OO programming languages. The method update (line 3) requires a share permission on the DG dg to be invoked. The class Observer (line 4) is also defined with a DG parameter dg and its constructor requires an object of type Subject dg .
The statement group g (line 7) creates a DG and assigns to it an atomic DGAP. The split(g) instruction consumes such atomic permission on g and splits it into three concurrent DGAP, one per each statement in the block (lines 10,11 and 12). According to the data dependencies, statements in lines 11 and 12 can be executed concurrently once s is instantiated in line 10. When the instructions in lines 11 and 12 have terminated, the concurrent DGAPs on g are joined back to an atomic permission on g. When this happens, the split block in line 13 consumes such permission and splits it into two concurrent DGAPs so that statements in lines 14 and 15 can be executed concurrently. Hence, DGAPs enforce a data group dependency between the two blocks (in gray in the figure) of code. 
An Access Permission Based Language
This section formalizes the syntax we have used in the previous examples. Our language is based on the core calculus µAEminium (Stork et al. 2014) for AEminium (Stork et al. 2009 ), an OO programming language where concurrent behavior arises when methods require non-conflicting APs, as exemplified in the last section. As a core calculus, it focuses on the mechanisms to control the flow of permissions and it abstracts away from other implementation details of the language (e.g., control structures). Unlike µAEminium, our core calculus abstracts away also from: (1) specific implementation details to guarantee atomicity (e.g., the inatomic statement used in the intermediate code of AEminium to keep track of entered atomic blocks), (2) mechanisms to define internal data groups, i.e., DGs in our language can only be declared in the main function, and (3), we do not consider class inheritance. Programs are built from the syntax in Fig. 3 . DGs are declared with group g 1 , · · · , g n . APs on objects can be unique, immutable or none (for null references), and share on the DG g (shr : g). A program consists of a series of class definitions ( CL) and a main body. A class can be parametrized in zero or more DG names ( g ) and it contains zero or several fields (F ), constructors ( CTR) and methods ( M ).
A class field (attribute) is declared by using a valid type and a field name. Note that a type is simply an identifier of a class with its respective DG parameters.
Constructors and methods specify the required permissions for the caller (p(this)) and the arguments ( p(x)) as well as the permissions restored to the environment. c, m, a, x, g ranges, respectively, over name of classes, methods, fields, variables and data groups. x denotes a possibly empty sequence of variables x 1 , ...., x n . This notation is similarly used for other syntactic categories.
A reference r can be a variable, the self reference this or a field selection as in x.a. As for the statements, we have the following: -The let constructor allows us to create local variables.
-After the assignment r g := rhs, both r and rhs point to the same object (or null) as follows: (1) if rhs has a unique permission on an object o, then after the assignment, r and rhs have a share permission shr : g on o. This explains the need of " g " in the syntax. As syntactic sugar one could decree that r l := r r means r l default := r r where default is a predefined DG; (2) if rhs has a shr : g (resp imm) permission on o, then r and rhs end with a shr : g (resp imm) permission on o. Finally, (4) if rhs = null or it is a null reference, then r and rhs end with a none permission. We note that in assignments, the right and left hand sides are references. We do not lose generality since it is possible to unfold more general expressions by using local variables. -An object's method can be invoked by using a reference to it with the right number of parameters as in r.m( r). We assume that in a call to a method (or constructor), the actual parameters are references (i.e., variables, including this, and attributes) and not arbitrary expressions. Since we have parameters by reference, we assume that the returned type is void and we omit it in the signature. -A new instance of a given class is created by r := new c g ( r) where we specify the required DG parameters g and actual parameters ( r) of the constructor. -For each g i , split g 1 , ..., g n {s 1 · · · s m } consumes an atomic or a concurrent DGAP on g i . Then, it splits each of such DGAPs into m concurrent DGAPs (one per each statement in the block). Once the statements in the block have finished their execution, the concurrent DGAPs created are consumed and the original DGAPs are restored. -Finally, we can compose several statements in a block {s 1 , .., s n } where the concurrent execution of statements is allowed according to the data dependencies imposed by the APs and the DGAPs: once s i has successfully consumed its needed permissions, the execution of s i+1 may start concurrently. Moreover, if s i cannot acquire the needed permissions, it must wait until such permissions are released by the preceding statements.
Remark 2.1 (Circular Recursive Definitions) The AP language in Fig. 3 allows us to write recursive methods. However, the language lacks control structures (e.g. if-then-else statements) to specify base cases in recursive definitions. This language must be understood as a core language to specify the AP mechanisms and not as a complete OO programming language implementing the usual data and control structures. Hence, we shall assume that there are no circular recursive definitions in the source program. Due to the lack of control structures, this is an unavoidable restriction to guarantee termination of the analyzes in Sections 4 and 5.
Dependencies and Execution. Recall that blocks of sentences are enclosed by curly brackets. Hence, we say that a sentence s occurs in a block if s is inside the braces of that block. 
The semantics of AP programs share with other semantics for OO languages (see e.g., (Igarashi et al. 2001) ) the rules and contexts to keep track of references, objects as well as lookup tables to identify class names, fields and methods with their respective definitions. Additionally, in the case of AP programs, the semantics relies on an evaluation context to keep track of the DGs created as well as the available APs in the system. This context plays an important role in the semantic rules: a statement s is executed only if the evaluation context possesses all the permissions required by s. Moreover, in order to allow parallel executions, once s consumes the needed permissions, the next statement (in the lexical order of the program) is enabled for execution. For instance, in a block of statements s 1 , ..., s n , the execution starts by enabling s 1 . Each enabled statement s i checks whether the required permissions are available. If this is the case, such permissions are consumed, s i starts its execution and the next statement s i+1 is enabled. When s i terminates its execution, the consumed permissions are restored to the environment. On the other side, if the permissions required by s i are not available, s i must wait until the needed permissions are released/produced by the preceding statements. Hence, non-conflicting blocks lead to concurrent executions and conflicting blocks are sequentialized according to the lexical order of the program (as in Figures 1 and 2) .
The reader may refer to (Stork et al. 2014, Sections 3.2 and 3.3) for the semantic rules of µAEminium that can be easily adapted to the sublanguage in Figure 3 . In Section 4 we give a precise definition of the needed evaluation contexts by using constraints (i.e., formulas in logic) and the state transformation by means of concurrent processes consuming and producing those constraints.
Linear Concurrent Constraint Programming
Concurrent Constraint Programming (ccp) (Saraswat and Rinard 1990; Saraswat et al. 1991; Saraswat 1993 ) (see a survey in (Olarte et al. 2013) ) is a model for concurrency that combines the traditional operational view of process calculi with a declarative view based on logic. This allows ccp to benefit from the large set of reasoning techniques of both process calculi and logic. Agents in ccp interact with each other by telling and asking information represented as constraints to a global store. The type of constraints is parametric in a constraint system (Saraswat et al. 1991 ) that specifies the basic constraints that agents can tell and ask during execution. Such systems can be specified as Scott information systems as in (Saraswat and Rinard 1990; Saraswat et al. 1991) or they can be specified in a suitable fragment of logic (see e.g., (Fages et al. 2001; Nielsen et al. 2002) ).
The basic constructs (processes) in ccp are: (1) the tell agent c, which adds the constraint c to the store, thus making it available to the other processes. Once a constraint is added, it cannot be removed from the store (i.e., the store grows monotonically). And (2), the ask process c → P , that queries if c can be deduced from the information in the current store; if so, the agent behaves like P , otherwise, it remains blocked until more information is added to the store. In this way, ask processes define a simple and powerful synchronization mechanism based on entailment of constraints.
Linear Concurrent Constraint Programming (lcc) (Fages et al. 2001 ) is a ccp-based calculus that considers constraint systems built from a fragment of Girard's intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) (Girard 1987) . The move to a linear discipline permits ask agents to consume information (i.e., constraints) from the store.
Definition 2 (Linear Constraint Systems (Fages et al. 2001) ) A linear constraint system is a pair (C, ) where C is a set of formulas (linear constraints) built from a signature Σ (a set of function and relation symbols), a denumerable set of variables V and the following ILL operators: multiplicative conjunction (⊗) and its neutral element (1), the existential quantifier (∃) and the exponential bang (!). We shall use The connective ⊗ allows us to conjoin information in the store and 1 denotes the empty store. As usual, existential quantification is used to hide information. The exponential ! c represents the arbitrary duplication of the resource c. The entailment d c means that the information c can be deduced from the information represented by constraint d, possibly using the axioms in the theory ∆. This theory gives meaning to (uninterpreted) predicates. For instance, if R is a transitive relation, ∆ may contain the axiom ∀x, y, z.[R(x, y) ⊗ R(y, z) R(x, z)]. We assume that "! " has a tighter binding than ⊗ and so, we understand ! c 1 ⊗c 2 as (! c 1 )⊗ c 2 . For the rest of the operators we shall explicitly use parenthesis to avoid ambiguities. Given a finite set of indexes I = {1, ..., n}, we shall use i∈I F i to denote the formula
We note that, according to Definition 2, constraints are built from the ILL fragment ⊗, 1, ∃ ,!. We decided to include all ILL connectives in Figure 4 (linear implication , additive conjunction and disjunction ⊕, the universal quantifier ∀ and the unit ) since those connectives will be used to encode lcc processes in Section 5.
The Language of Processes
Similar to other ccp-based calculi, lcc, in addition to tell and ask agents, provides constructs for parallel composition, hiding of variables, non-deterministic choices and process definitions and calls. More precisely:
Definition 3 (lcc agents (Fages et al. 2001) ) Agents in lcc are built from constraints as follows:
A lcc program takes the form D.P where D is a set of process definitions of the form p( y) ∆ = P where all free variables of P are in the set of pairwise distinct variables y. We assume D to have a unique process definition for every process name.
Let us give some intuitions about the above constructs. The tell agent c adds constraint c to the current store d producing the new store d ⊗ c.
Consider the guarded choice Q = i∈I ∀ x i (c i → P i ) where I is a finite set of indexes.
Let j ∈ I, d be the current store and θ be the substitution [ t/ x j ] where t is a sequence of terms.
and consumes c j θ. If none of the guards c i can be deduced from d, the process Q blocks until more information is added to the store. Moreover, if many guards can be deduced, one of the alternatives is non-deterministically chosen for execution. To simplify the notation, we shall omit "
when I is a singleton; if the sequence of variables x is empty, we shall write c → P instead of ∀ x(c → P ); moreover, if |I| = 2, we shall use "+" instead of " " as in
The interleaved parallel composition of P and Q is denoted by P Q. We shall use Π i∈I P i to denote the parallel composition P 1 · · · P n , where I = {1, 2, ..., n}. If
The agent ∃ x(P ) behaves like P and binds the variables x to be local to it. The processes ∃ x(P ) and ∀ x(c → P ), as well as the constraint ∃ x(c), bind the variables x in P and c. We shall use fv (P ) and fv (c) to denote, respectively, the set of free variables of P and c.
Finally, given a process declaration of the form p( y)
Operational Semantics
Before giving a formal definition of the operational semantics of lcc agents, let us give an example of how processes evolve. For that, we shall use P ; c −→ P ; c to denote that the agent P under store c evolves into the agent P producing the store c . This notation will be precisely defined shortly.
Example 3.1 (Consuming Permissions)
Let us assume a constraint system with predicates ref/3, ct/2; constant symbols unq, imm, none, 0, nil ; function symbol s (successor); and equipped with the axiom:
Informally, ∆ says that an imm permission can be upgraded to unq if there is only one reference pointing to o. Consider now the processes
Roughly, P 1 adds to the store the information required to state that x points to o x with permission imm and that there is exactly one reference to o x . P 2 states that there are two references (y and z) pointing to the same object o y . Process Q, in order to evolve, requires x to have a unique permission on o x . Finally, R is asking whether y has a unique permission on a given object o to execute R (not specified here).
Starting from the configuration P 1 P 2 Q R; 1 , we observe the derivation below:
(1)
From the initial store 1, neither Q nor R can deduce their guards and they remain blocked (line 1). Tell processes P 1 (line 3) and P 2 (line 2) evolve by adding information to the store. Let d (resp. d ) be the store in the configuration of line 3 (resp. line 4) and c be the guard of the ask agent Q. We note that
Recall that checking this entailment amounts to prove in ILL the sequent
In this case, the axiom ∆ allows us to transform ref( 
Operational Semantics Let us extend the processes-store configurations used in Example 3.1 to consider configurations of the form X; Γ; c . Here X is the set of local (hidden) variables in Γ and c, Γ is a multiset of processes of the form P 1 , ..., P n representing the parallel composition P 1 · · · P n , and c represents the current store. In what follows, we shall indistinguishably use the notation of multiset as parallel composition of processes. The transition relation −→ defined on configurations is the least relation satisfying the rules in Figure 5 . We shall use −→ * to denote the reflexive and transitive closure of −→. It is easy to see that rules R TELL , R LOC and R CALL realize the behavioral intuition given in the previous section. Let us explain the Rule R CHOICE . Recall that the process 
for an arbitrary e and t . We say that e and t are the most general choices, notation mgc(e, t), whenever e e implies e e and c[ t/ x] c[ t / x].
The mgc requirement in rule R CHOICE prevents from an unwanted weakening of the store. For instance, consider the ask agent Q = c → P . We know that ! c entails c ⊗ 1 (i.e., ! c c ⊗ 1). Hence, without the mgc condition, Q may consume ! c leading to the store 1. This is not satisfactory since Q did not consume the minimal information required to entail its guard. In this particular case, we have to consider the entailment ! c ! c ⊗ c where Q can entail its guard and the store remains the same. For further details, please refer to (Haemmerlé 2011) .
Sequential Composition
In the subsequent sections we shall use the derived operator P ; Q that delays the execution of Q until P signals its termination. This operator can be encoded in lcc as follows. Let z be a variable that does not occur in P nor in Q and let sync(·) be an uninterpreted predicate symbol that does not occur in the program. The process P ; Q is defined as ∃z( Figure 6 . Intuitively, C[[P ]] z adds the constraint sync(z) to signal the termination of P . Then, the ask agent sync(z) → Q reduces to Q. Note that in a parallel composition P R, one has to wait for the termination of both P and R before adding the constraint sync(z). For that, C[[P R]] z creates fresh variables w 1 and w 2 to signal the termination of, respectively, P and R. Then, it adds sync(z) only when both sync(w 1 ) and sync(w 2 ) can be deduced. Assume now a process definition of the form p( y) def = P . We require the process P to emit 
AP Programs as LCC Processes
This section presents an interpretation of Access Permissions (APs) and Data Group Access Permissions (DGAPs) as processes in lcc. We thus endow AP programs with a declarative semantics which is adequate to verify relevant properties as we show later. We start defining the constraint system we shall use. Constants, predicate symbols and non-logical axioms are depicted in Figure 7 and explained below.
We shall use c, m, a, g, o to range, respectively, over name of classes, methods, fields, DGs and objects in the source AP language. For variables, we shall use x, y and u. We may also use primed and subindexed version of these letters. We shall use the same letters in our encodings. Hence, if x occurs in a constraint (see e.g., predicate ref(·) below), it should be understood as the representation of a variable x in the source language. Finally, we shall use z, w (possible primed or subindexed) to represent identifiers of statements in the source program. Those variables will appear in the scope of constraints used for synchronization in the model as, e.g., in the constraint sync(·).
Permissions and constants: Constant symbols in sets PER and GPER represent the kind of APs and DGAPs available in the language. Since none, unique and immutable AP are not associated to any data group, we shall use the constant ndg to denote "no-group". Recall that the split command splits a DGAP into several DGAPs, one per each statement in the block. Then, we require to specify in our model the statement to which the concurrent permission is attached to (see predicate dg(·) below). Since atomic DGAPs are not attached to any particular statement in the program, we use the constant nst to denote "no-statement". The constant nil is used to denote a null reference. Assume a class c with an attribute a and a data group parameter g. We use the constant symbol c a to make reference to a (see predicate field(·) below) and a constant symbol c g to make reference to g (see gparam(·) below). We also consider the constant symbols g 1 , ..., g n to give meaning to the statement group g 1 , · · · , g n .
References and Fields:
We use the predicate symbol ref (x, o, p, g ) to represent that the variable x is pointing to object o and it has a permission p on it. The last parameter of this predicate is used to give meaning to share permissions of the form shr : g. As we already explained, g = ndg when p = shr. The predicate field(x u , o, a) associates (x, o, p, g) x points to object o with permission p ∈ PER and belongs to the data group g field (u, o, a) u is the reference to field a of object o.
The group parameter g of the object o was instantiated with the data group gp. sync(z)
Synchronizing on variable z.
There are n references pointing to object o.
Statement z has a data group permission of type p ∈ GPER on the data group g. the variable x u to the field a of object o. Once an object of a given class c with data group parameters is instantiated, the predicate gparam(c g, o, gp) dictates that the group parameter g of the object o was instantiated with the DG gp. The predicate sync(z) is used in the definition of P ; Q as explained in the previous section. Constraints act(z), run(z) and end(z) represent, respectively, that statement z has been called, it is currently being executed or it has finished. We shall use those constraints as witnesses for verification purposes. The number of references (alias) pointing to a given object are modeled with the predicate ct(o, n). Given a data group g, the predicate dg(g, p, z) dictates that the statement z has a data group permission p ∈ GPER on g. If p = atm then z = nst.
Non-logical axioms: The entailment of the constraint system allows us to formalize when a given AP can be transformed into another. Assume that x has a unique permission on o. Unique permissions can be downgraded to share or immutable permissions as dictated by axioms downgrade 1 and downgrade 2 respectively. Axiom upgrade 1 (resp. upgrade 2 ) builds a unique permission from a share (resp. immutable) permission. For that, x needs to be the unique reference with share or immutable permission to the pointed object. Conversions from share permissions into immutable and vice versa require to first upgrade the permission to unique and then applying the appropriate downgrade axiom.
Modeling Statements.
Given an AP annotated program, we shall build a lcc program D.P where D includes process definitions for each method and constructor of the AP program (Section 4.2 below) and a process definition to encode assignments (assg in Figure 8 ). The process P represents the encoding of the main body of the AP program where each statement s is encoded as a lcc process S
[[s]]
G z that models its behavior.
assg(x, y, z, gt)
Fig. 8: Auxiliary definitions for Rule R ALIAS

The process S[[s]]
G z adheres to the following schema. The lcc variable z is used to represent the statement s in the model. We assume (by renaming variables if necessary) that z does not occur in s. The encoding uses constrains to signal three possible states in the execution of s. When the program control reaches the statement s, the encoding adds the constraint act(z) to signal that s is ready to be executed. When the needed permissions for s are successfully acquired, act(z) is consumed and constraints sync(z) and run(z) are added. The first one is used to synchronize with the rest of the model. More precisely, the encoding of the next instruction in the program waits for constraint sync(z) to be posted before starting its execution. In this way, we model the data dependencies resulting from the flow of APs. Constraint run(z) signals that s is currently being executed. Once s has finished and the consumed permissions are restored, the encoding consumes run(z) and adds the constraint end(z).
The
G z stands for the set of DGs on which s must have a concurrent DGAP to be executed. Recall that such permissions are assigned by a split command. Then, we use G to control which DGAPs must be consumed and restored by s.
In the following we define S[[s]]
G z for each kind of statement in the syntax in Figure 3 . For that, the following shorthand will be useful ( def = must be understood as a shorthand and not as process definition):
Assume that s is an statement and
The process wrap(P, G, z) first consumes all the concurrent DGAPs available for s, i.e., those in the set G. If G = ∅, then i∈1..n dg(g i , conc, z) is defined as 1. Observe that once s has terminated (i.e., the constraint end(z) is added to the store) such permissions are restored.
Assignments. We have different cases for the assignment r g := rhs depending whether r and rhs are variables or field selections. Let us start with the case when both are variables as in x g := y and x is syntactically different from y. We have:
where assg is defined in Figure 8 . The variable x loses its permission to the pointed object o, and the object o has one less reference pointing to it (Definition drop). Thereafter, x and y point to the same object and the permission of y is split between x and y as explained in Section 2.2 (Definition gain). Finally, once the permission to y is split, the constraints sync(z) and !end(z) are added to the store to, respectively, synchronize with the rest of the program and mark the termination of the statement. Note in assg the use of the constraints act(·), run(·) and end(·). Initially, constraint act(z) is added (by wrap).
When the permissions on x and y are split (after drop and gain), act(z) is consumed to produce run(z). Finally, run(z) is consumed to produce end(z).
If the variable x points to the object o of class c, then the field a of o can be accessed via the variable u whenever the constraint field(u, o, c a) holds. Intuitively, u points to x.a and then, a constraint ref (u, o , p, g) dictates that x.a points to o with permission p. As we shall show later, the model of constructors adds the constraint ! field(u, o, c a) to establish the connection between objects and their fields. The model of the assignment
The cases x.a g := y.a and x g := y.a are similar.
Let. Local variables in the AP program are defined as local variables in lcc:
where GC def = end(z) → i∈1..| x| drop(x i ). Observe that the freshly created variables point to nil with no permissions. Once s ends its execution, the local variables are destroyed (definition GC). We note also that, in this case, we do not add the constraint sync(z) nor end(z). The reason is that the creation of the local variable can be considered as "instantaneous" and then, the process S[[s]] G z will be in charge of marking the termination of the statement. Note that we ignore the type T since our model and analyses are concerned only with the flow of access permissions and we assume that the source program is well typed.
Block of statements. In the block {s 1 · · · s i s j · · · s n }, the process modeling s j runs in parallel with the other processes once S[[s i ]] G zi adds the constraint sync(z i ) to the store. Hence, what we observe is that the execution of s j is delayed until the encoding of s i has successfully consumed the required permissions. After that, even if s i has not terminated, the encoding of s j can proceed. Once sync(z n ) can be deduced, constraint sync(z) is added to the store to synchronize with the rest of the program. Moreover, the constraint end(z) is added only when all the statements s 1 , ..., s n have finished their execution:
where P is defined as:
Groups of permissions. In order to define DGs, we add a constraint specifying that each of those groups has an atomic DGAP. Recall that the constant nst indicates that the atomic 
Similar to the creation of local variables, we do not mark termination of this statement since it can be considered as "instantaneous".
Split. Let G = {g 1 , ..., g m }. We define the rule for split as follows.
where P and definitions gainP, addP, exec and restoreP are in Figure 9 . Before explaining those definitions, consider the following code:
1 split <g1,g2>{ G z where G = {g 2 , g 3 }. The set G = {g 1 , g 2 } corresponds to the concurrent DGAPs assigned by the external split statement in line 1. The process gainP consumes either atomic or concurrent permissions for each DG g i ∈ G . Since such permissions must be restored once the split command has been executed, we distinguish the case when the consumed permission is concurrent (conc) or atomic (atm). For that, we use the auxiliary predicate symbol (constraint) env(·) that keeps information of the DGAP consumed. We note that the DGAP g 2 ∈ G ∩ G is consumed and then split again to be assigned to the statement s 2 . Now consider the DG g 1 ∈ G \ G . Since g 1 ∈ G , the DGAP on this group must be consumed ant it must not be split to be assigned to s 2 . Hence, the consumption of any g ∈ G \ G is handled by the wrap(·) process as in the encoding of other statements.
Once we have consumed the appropriate DGAPs, we add, for each statement in the block, a concurrent DGAP for each of the data groups in G (definition addP).
The process exec is similar to Rule R COMP but it uses as parameter G . In our example, this means that concurrent DGAPs on g 2 and g 3 (and not on g 1 ) are assigned to s 2 . As we already saw in the definition of R COMP , the constraint sync(z ) is added to the store once all the statements in the block were able to consume the required APs. At this point, we wait for all the instructions to reestablish their assigned DGAPs (definition restoreP). Recall that this happens only when the statements terminate (see definition wrap).
Finally, with the help of the constraints env(·), we restore the DGAPs to the environment and we add the constraint !end(z) to mark the ending of the block.
Method calls and Object instantiation. In our encoding we shall write methods and constructors using functional notation rather than object-oriented notation. For instance, x.m( y) is written as c m(x, y) when x is an object of type c. Similarly, the expression c c(x, y) corresponds to x := new c( y). As we shall see, for each method m( y) of the class c, we shall generate a process definition c m(x, y, z) ∆ = P . The extra argument z is used to later add the constraint sync(z) to synchronize with the rest of the program. If x is of type c, the rule is defined as follows:
The case of the call x.a.m( y) can be obtained by using the constraint field(·) as we did in Rule R ALIASF for assignments between fields.
The model of an object initialization is defined similarly but we add also as a parameter the instances of the data groups: 
where n = | y| = | y |,
and the auxiliary process definitions consume(·) and r env(·) are in Figure 10 . In the process definition c m(x, y, z), the first parameter x represents the object caller this and the last parameter z is used for synchronization. This definition first declares the local variables y and x to replace the formal parameters ( y) and the caller (x) by the actual parameters. Next, it consumes the required permissions from y and x, and assigns them to the previously mentioned local variables. Finally, the constraint sync(z) is added and the encoding of the method's body is executed. In the following we explain the definitions Consume and Body.
The definition of consume(x, x , p, c) in Figure 10 can be read as "consume the permission p on the variable x and assign it to the variable x . If the required permission is share or immutable, the permission is split and restored to allow concurrent executions in the environment that called the method. We recall that in p = shr : g, g must be a data group parameter in the class c. This explains the last parameter in consume(·). We then use the predicate ! gparam(c g, o, g), added by the encoding of constructors, as we shall see, to establish the link between the DG parameter and the current DG. Finally, unique and none permissions are consumed and transferred to the local variables. Now we focus on the definition Body where s denotes s after replacing y i by y i and x by x . Once s finishes (i.e., it adds end(z ) to the store), the references and permissions of the local variables created to handle the parameters are consumed and restored to the environment according to r env(x, p, x , p , c) in Figure 10 (consume the permission p on x and transforms it into a permission p to the variable x ). Let us give some intuition about the cases considered in this definition. Recall that consume replicates the shr and imm permissions for the variables internal to the method. Therefore, we only need to consume those permissions and decrease the number of references pointing to object o . When the input permissions are unq or none, consume transfers those permissions to the local variables and consumes the external references. Then, r env needs to restore the external reference and consume the local one (the number of references pointing to o remains the same). When the method changes the input permission from share or immutable into a unique or none, we need to consume first the external reference. Afterwards, we transfer the internal permission and reference to the external variable.
Constructor definitions. Let c( c y g x y) none(this), p(y) ⇒ p (this), p (y) {s} be a constructor of a parameterized class c pg 1 , ..., pg k . We define Figure 1 where n = | y| = | y | and
The mechanisms for parameter passing, executing the body s and restoring permissions are the same as in method definitions. The definition consume' is similar to consume in method definitions but, instead of using consume(x, x , p, c), we consume the constraint ref(x, nil , none, nst), i.e., x in the statement x := new c g ( y) is restricted to be a null reference. Moreover, the internal variable x points to the newly created object o new with permission unique.
The definition gparam-init allows us to establish the link between the new object o new and the group parameters. In the constraint gparam(c pg i , o new , g i ), the constant symbol c pg i corresponds to the name defined for the DG parameter pg i of the class c pg 1 , ..., pg k and g i is the current DG passed as parameter.
The initialization of fields is controlled by the definition fields-init. The added constraint field(u i , o new , c a i ) establishes the link between the field o new .a i and the null reference u i .
Let us present a couple of examples to show the proposed model in action.
Example 4.1 (Access Permission Flow) Assume the class definitions stats and collection in Figure 1 and the main body in Figure  11 . The lcc agent modeling the statement in line 10 calls collection collection(c, z 10 ), which triggers the execution of the body of the constructor (see Rules R CDEF and R CALL ). Variable z 10 is the local variable used to synchronize with the rest of the program (see Rule R COMP ). Once the agents modeling the statements in lines 10 and 11 are executed, the following store is observed:
Hence, c (resp. s) points to o c (resp. o s ) with a unique permission. In c.compStats(), c requires an immutable permission to o c . The axiom downgrade 2 is used to entail the guard of consume in the definition of the method. Let c be the representation of c inside the method (see Rule R MDEF ). We notice that when the body of the method is being executed, both c and c have an immutable permission to o c , i.e., the store contains the tokens
s, o1 and o2 are null references (see Rule RLOC).
The atm DGAP on g is consumed and split into conc permission for statements in lines 11-12 (see Rule RSPLIT)
Variables s and obs are instantiated. The atomic DGAP has not been restored yet and then, statement in line 13 has to wait.
Before 13(2) dg(g, atm, nst) ⊗ ref(s, os, shr, g) ⊗ · · · Concurrent DGAPs are consumed and the atomic permission on g is restored (see Rule RSPLIT).
There are 3 references to os: s, s and s . The last two correspond to the internal representation of s in the calls to method update (see Rule Rule RMDEF). Then, such methods can be executed concurrently. We also see that the atm DGAP was split into conc DGAP for statements 14 and 15.
In the end, s is the sole reference to os (see r env in Rule RMDEF) and the atomic DGAP on g is reestablished. Before executing the body of method compStats constraint sync(z 12 ) is added, so as to allow possible concurrent executions in the main body (see Rule R COMP ). Hence, the agent modeling the statement in line 13 can be executed and we have a store with three references with immutable permission to object o c , namely, c, c as before, and c , the representation of c inside the method print. Now, once constraint sync(z 13 ) is added by the definition of print, the process representing the statement in line 14 can be executed. However, this call requires c to have a unique permission to o c which is not possible since the axiom upgrade 2 requires that c is the sole reference to o c . Hence, the guard consume for this call is delayed (synchronized) until the permissions on c and c are consumed and restored to the environment (see r env in Rule R MDEF ). We then observe that statements in lines 12 and 13 can be executed concurrently but the statement in line 14 is delayed until the termination of the previous ones.
Example 4.2 (Data Group Permissions Flow)
Now consider the program in Figure 2 . Figure 12 shows the stores generated by the model of this program. We omit some tokens for the sake of readability. Consider the call c.compStats(s) and suppose that, in the lcc model, variable c points to the object o c . When the compStats method is invoked, the immutable permission is divided between the external reference c and the internal reference c . For this reason, inside the method, reference c cannot acquire a unique permission for the invocation of method sort which then blocks. Our analysis will thus inform that there is a deadlock, unless, e.g., the program includes the statement c g := nil to discard the permission of c to o c .
Consider now the following definition of the same method: 1 compStats(s) unq(this), unq(s) => unq(this), unq(s) { 2 ... When compStats is invoked, the unique permission is transferred from reference c to (the internal) reference c . The invocation of method sort has thus the right permissions to be executed and it does not block.
The Model as a Runnable Specification
Models based on the ccp paradigm can be regarded as runnable specifications, and so we can observe how permissions evolve during program execution by running the underlying lcc model. We implemented an interpreter of lcc in Java and used Antlr (http: //www.antlr.org) to generate a parser from AP programs into lcc processes following our encoding. The resulting lcc process is then executed and a program trace is output. The interpreter and the parser have been integrated into Alcove (Access Permission Linear COnstraints VErifier) Animator, a web application freely available at http: //subsell.logic.at/alcove2/. The URL further includes all the examples presented in this section. In the following we explain some outputs of the tool.
Example 4.4 (Trace of Access Permissions)
The program in Figure 1 generates the trace depicted in Figure 13 . For verification purposes, the implementation extends the predicates act(·), run(·) and end(·) to include also the variable that called the method, the name of the method and the number of line of the call. Note for instance that the call to print (line 9 in Fig. 13 ) was marked while the method sort was running (line 7). Nevertheless, the execution of print (line 11) must wait until sort terminates (line 10). In this trace, the constructor stats (line 5) runs in parallel with sort (line 7). Finally, the execution of removeDuplicates (line 17) is delayed until the methods print (line 13) and compStats (line 16) terminate. Lines 20 and 21 show that both c and s end with a unique permission to objects o_4774 and o_79106, respectively (the numbers that follow the variable names are generated each time a local variable is created to avoid clash of names). The assignment in line 13 aliases svar and s so they share the same permission afterwards. Therefore, s cannot recover the unique permission to execute the statement in line 14, thus leading to a permission deadlock. This bug is detected by Alcove as depicted in Figure 14 (line 13). Observe in the trace that compstats is called (line 7 in the trace) but not executed. Furthermore, both s and svar have a share permission on the same pointed object (lines 17 and 18). Moreover, both c (c_644) and its internal representation inside compStats (inner_136172) have an immutable permission on object o_6491 (lines 16 and 19) . Lines 8-11 show the suspended lcc processes in the end of the computation that were killed by the scheduler. Particularly, line 10 shows that there is an ask agent trying to consume a unique permission on object O_142 pointed by S_745.
Adequacy of the Encoding
In this section we present some invariant properties of the encoding and prove it correct. There are three key arguments in our proofs:
Observation 4.1 (Ask agents) (1) the ask agents controlling both the APs (Proposition 4.1) and the state of statements (Proposition 4.2) are of the form c → P where P is a tell agent (and not, e.g., a parallel composition). Hence, in one single transition, the encoding consumes and produces the needed tokens to maintain the invariants (ruling out intermediate states where the property might not hold). Moreover, (2) such ask agents are preceded by the sequential composition operator ";". This means that, before consuming the needed constraints, some action must have been finished. In particular, (3) the ask agent act(z) → run(z) is executed only when the needed permissions are consumed and the ask agent run(z) → end(z) is executed only after restoring the consumed permissions (Rules R ALIAS , R CDEF and R MDEF ).
The following invariants show that the lcc model correctly keeps track of the variables and their corresponding pointed objects. 
Proof
An inspection of the encoding reveals that the rules R ALIAS and R LOC and the definitions consume, r env and fields-init are the only ones that consume/produce ref(·) and ct(·) constraints. For any newly created variable, R LOC and fields-init add the needed ref(·) token adhering to item 4. Moreover, the ask agents in the above rules/definitions adhere to the conditions in Observation 4.1. Therefore, if the agent c → P consumes a constraint of the form ref (x, o, p, g) , the tell process P adds the needed constraints to maintain correct the counting of references to o.
The next proposition shows that the encoding correctly captures the state of statements.
Proposition 4.2 (States)
Let State = {act, run, end}, S be an AP program and D.P its corresponding lcc translation. Consider an arbitrary execution starting at P :
Let z ∈ X n , st ∈ State, x ∈ 1 . . . n and assume that c x st(z). Then, 
Proof
Note that the token act(z) is added when the encoding of a statement is activated (wrap).
An inspection of the encoding shows that the ask agents controlling the state of statements adhere to conditions in Observation 4.1. Since each executed statement uses a freshly created variable z (see R COMP ), we can show that, for any z and multiset Γ x , Γ x can contain at most one of each of such ask agents (using z). Hence, for all st ∈ State, if s(z) is consumed from the store c x , the store c x+1 must contain the next state st (z). This guarantees the correct ordering of states.
We conclude by showing that the encoding enforces the execution of statements according to the AP specification. More precisely, the activation of a statement s is delayed until its (lexical) predecessor has successfully consumed the needed permissions; the execution of s is delayed until its required permissions are available (and consumed); signalling the termination of s is delayed until all the consumed permissions are restored.
Theorem 4.1 (Adequacy) Let S be an AP program and D.P its corresponding lcc translation. Let s i and s j be two sentences that occur in the same block and s j is lexically after s i . Then, 1. (safety) s i and s j are in conflict iff for any reachable configuration (X; Γ; c) from (X; P ; 1), c run(z sj ) implies c end(z si ). 2. (concurrency) s i is not in conflict with s j iff there exists a reachable configuration (X; Γ; c) from (X; P ; 1) s.t. c run(z si ) and c run(z sj ).
The execution of assignments, the call to methods/constructors and the beginning of blocks are the statements we have to synchronize in the encoding. Note that rules R ALIAS , R CDEF , R MDEF , R SPLIT and R COMP adhere to conditions in Observation 4.1. In particular, condition (3) shows that the changes of states are controlled by acquiring / releasing permissions.
(⇒) 1. Assume that s i and s j both require a unique permission on the same object (the other kind of conflicts are similar). From rule R COMP , we know that s i first consumes its permissions (before enabling s j ). From Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we can show that s j cannot move to the state run until s i moves to state end.
2. If there are no conflicting resources, then both processes may successfully consume Fig. 15 : Interpretation of lcc processes as ILL formulas.
the needed permissions from the store. Consider the following trace: the encoding of s i consumes the needed permissions, adds run(z si ) and the sync(z si ) token. Then, the encoding of s 2 can start its execution (consuming sync(z si )), consumes the needed permissions and adds run(z sj ) to the store.
(⇐) For (1), assume that in any reachable configuration (X; Γ; c), c run(z sj ) implies c end(z si ). By Proposition 4.2 we know that c run(z si ). Since the encoding maintains correct the number of references (in the sense of Proposition 4.1), there is no reachable store able to entail the permissions needed for both s i and s j . Hence, there is a conflicting access in s i and s j . The case (2) follows from a similar argument.
Logical Meaning of Access Permissions
Besides playing the role of executable specifications, ccp-based models can be declaratively interpreted as formulas in logic (Saraswat 1993; de Boer et al. 1997; Nielsen et al. 2002; Fages et al. 2001; Olarte and Pimentel 2017) . This section provides additional mechanisms and tools for verifying properties of AP based programs. More concretely, we take the lcc agents generated from the AP program and translate them as an intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) formula. Then, a property specified in ILL is verified with the Alcove LL Prover, a theorem prover implemented on top of Teyjus (http: //teyjus.cs.umn.edu), an implementation of λ-Prolog (Nadathur and Miller 1988; Miller and Nadathur 2012) .
Our analyses are based on reachability properties, i.e., we verify the existence of reachable lcc configurations satisfying some conditions. It turns out that this is enough for verifying interesting properties of AP programs. For instance, we can check whether a program is dead-lock free or whether two statements can be executed concurrently.
Agents as Formulas
The logical interpretation of lcc agents as formulas in intuitionistic linear logic ILL is defined with the aid of a function L[ [·] ] defined in Figure 15 (Fages et al. 2001) . As expected, parallel composition is identified with multiplicative conjunction and ask processes correspond to linear implications. Moreover, process definitions are (universally quantified) implications to allow the unfolding of its body.
In what follows, we will show how to use logic in order to have a better control of the operational flow and, therefore, be able to verify properties of AP programs.
The first step consists of interpreting the lcc model in Section 4 as ILL formulas via L [[·] ]. We shall call definition clauses to the encoding of process definitions of the form p( x) ∆ = P (i.e., assignment and constructor and method definitions in our encoding) and s, svar, z, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5.(ref(c, nil , none, ndg we shall include them in a theory ∆, together with the axioms of upgrade and downgrade in Figure 7 . The next example illustrates this translation. For the sake of readability, we shall omit empty synchronizations such as sync(z) ⊗ (sync(z) → 1).
Example 5.1 (Agents as formulas)
Consider the following lcc process definition resulting from the encoding of the constructor of class collection in Figure 1 :
where the first 1 corresponds to the empty parallel composition in gparam-init. From now on, for the sake of readability, we will identify A ≡ A ⊗ 1. This process definition gives rise to the following (universally quantified) definition clause:
The underlying brackets will be used in Section 5.4 for determining the complexity of decomposing this formula The theory ∆ contains the definition clause above and the definition clauses for the other methods and constructors in Figure 1 (i.e., collection sort, collection print, etc). ∆ also contains the axioms for upgrading and downgrading permissions and the definition clause resulting from the process definition assg in Figure 8 . In Figure 16 we show the encoding for assg as well as the encoding L[[P ]] of the main program in Example 4.5.
Focusing and adequacy
In this section we show that the translations presented in the last section are neat, in the sense that one computational step corresponds to one focused phase in proofs (Andreoli 1992 ). This will not only guarantee that our encodings are adequate (in the sense that logical proofs mimics exactly computations), but also it will provide an elegant way of measuring the complexity of computations via complexity of derivations (see Section 5.4).
The approach for this section will be intuitive. The reader interested in the formalization of focusing and various levels of adequacy between ILL and lcc can check the details in (Olarte and Pimentel 2017) .
Let us start by analyzing the following two right rules in ILL (for the additive and multiplicative conjunctions):
Reading these rules bottom-up, while the first copies the contexts, the second involves a choice of which formulas should go to left or right premises. Computationally, these behaviors are completely different: while the price to pay on applying R is just the duplication of memory needed to store formulas in the context, in ⊗ R one has to decide on how to split the context, and this has exponential cost. These rules are very different from the proof theoretical point of view as well: the first rule turns out to be invertible in ILL, while the second is not. This implies that the rule R can be applied anywhere in the proof, and this will not affect provability. On the other hand, ⊗ R is not invertible and its application may involve backtracking. The same analysis can be done to all other rules in ILL, giving rise to two disjoint classes of rules: the invertible ones, that can be applied eagerly,
This separation induces a two phase proof construction: a negative, where no backtracking on the selection of inference rules is necessary, and a positive, where choices within inference rules can lead to failures for which one may need to backtrack.
An intuitive notion of focusing can be then stated as: a proof is focused if, seen bottomup, it is a sequence of alternations between maximal negative and positive phases.
Focusing is enough for assuring that the encoding presented in Section 5.1 is, indeed, adequate.
Theorem 5.1 (Adequacy (Olarte and Pimentel 2017)) Let P be a process, Ψ be a set of process definitions and ∆ be a set of non-logical axioms. Then, for any constraint c, (∅;
Moreover, one focused logical phase corresponds exactly to one operational step.
This result, together with Theorem 4.1, shows that AP can be adequately encoded in ILL in a natural way. In the present work we are more interested in using logic in order to verify properties of the computation, as clarified in the next example. On the other hand, there is also an interleaved execution of A 1 and A 2 that does not lead to the final store ok:
This trace does not have any correspondent derivation in focused ILL (see (Olarte and Pimentel 2017) 
for details).
This example is a good witness of a need for Alcove's verifier, other than just having an animator: an animator exhibits traces of possible executions without any pre-defined scheduling policy. One of such traces may not lead to the expected final store (as the ok above). On the other hand, the verifier would either fail (if a property is not provable) or succeed. In this last case, the proof produced by the prover corresponds exactly to a valid trace from the operational point of view.
Let us show an example of how focusing can control executions on a sequential composition.
Example 5.3 (Focusing on a Sequential Composition)
Consider the ILL interpretation of the sequential composition P ; Q:
This is a positive formula which will be on the left side of the sequent and ∃ and ⊗ will be decomposed in a negative phase. Once P is executed, we observe the invertible action of adding the atom sync(z) to the context. Then, one could change to a positive phase and focus on the negative formula sync(z)
. This positive action needs to be synchronized with the context, consuming sync(z) in order to produce
In the following sections, we shall show that a focused ILL prover is a complete decision procedure for reachability properties of the lcc agents resulting from our encodings. This will be useful to verify properties of the encoded AP program.
Linear Logic as a Framework for Verifying AP Properties
Let P be an agent and L[[P ]] its translation into ILL, producing a formula F together with a theory ∆. In order to verify a certain property G, specified by an ILL formula G, we test if the sequent ! ∆, F −→ G is provable.
First of all, observe that the fragment of ILL needed for encoding access permissions is given by the following grammar for guards/goals G and processes P :
where a is an atomic formula. Observe that guards G do not consider banged formulas, i.e., agents are not allowed to ask banged constraints. A simple inspection on the encoding of Section 4 shows that processes in our case indeed belong to such fragment. We note also that formulas generated from this grammar exhibit the following properties:
1. the left context in the sequent ! ∆, F −→ G will be formed by P formulas; 2. the right context will have only G formulas; 3. implications on the left can only introduce guards on the right side of a sequent. In fact, on examining a proof bottom-up, decomposing the implication on the sequent Γ 1 , Γ 2 , B C −→ D will produce the premises Γ 1 , C −→ D and Γ 2 −→ B. Hence it is important to guarantee that B (a guard) is a G (goal) formula.
Finally, notice that the fragment described above is undecidable in general, due to the presence of processes declarations (Lincoln et al. 1992 ). However, since we are considering AP programs adhering to the condition in Remark 2.1, our base language does not lead to cyclic recursive definitions. In next section, we determine an upper bound for the complexity of proofs in Alcove's verifier. Therefore, we can show that provability in the resulting ILL translation is decidable (see Theorem 5.2).
Complexity analysis
Note that, when searching for proofs in the focused system, the only non-deterministic step is the one choosing the focus formula in a positive phase. This determines completely the complexity of a proof in ILLF and it justifies the next definition.
Definition 5 (Proof Depth) Let π be a proof in ILLF. The depth of π is the maximum number of positive phases along any path in π from the root.
Example 5.4 (Complexity of Formulas)
Consider the formulas in Example 5.1. The depth of decomposing the definition clause collection collection(x, z) into its literal or purely positive subformulas is 8. To see that, note that focusing in such a negative formula on the left will produce 7 more nested positive phases in one of the branches of the proof: each one of these phases is signaled in the formula with an underlying bracket containing the respective number of the focused phase. The same holds when decomposing the clauses for stats stats(s, z) and collection compStats(c, s, z). As we will see later, decomposing assig(svar, s, z) has a fixed depth equal to 7. Hence the depth of a derivation for decomposing the formula F (the model of the main program) is 8 + 8 + 7 + 8 = 31.
We will now proceed with a careful complexity analysis of decomposing the formulas produced by the specification of AP programs. These will be placed on the left of the sequent. This is done by counting the changes of nested polarities, as in the example above. The complexity of decomposing a process P will be denoted by comp(L[[P ]]).
-Base cases. We will start by presenting the complexity for decomposing the different kinds of lcc processes:
-Sequential composition. Recall that the process P ; Q was defined in Figure 6 with the aid of the function 
In the definition of P ; Q, the constraint sync(z) will always be produced before executing Q. As already said, these are negative actions and hence do not interfere with the proof's complexity. However, if P is a parallel composition P = P 1 . . . , P n , then each process P i will produce its own synchronization token, and all of them will be consumed at once in order to produce the constraint sync(z). Hence, the complexity of decomposing P ; Q takes into account nested parallel compositions inside P .
-Wrap. The complexity of decomposing the sub formula wrap(P,
-Assignment. It is immediate to see that:
Hence, comp(assign) = comp (L[[wrap(assg(x, y, z, gt) , G, z)]]) = 7 + n + 3 = n + 10 where n is the number of elements in G. Observe that, when there are no group permissions, the wrap is not necessary and the complexity is the same as for decomposing L [[assg(x, y, z, gt) ]], which is 7.
-Axioms. The upgrade and downgrade axioms are negative formulas. Decomposing them has depth 1.
-Method definition. Let m be the number of parameters of a method and suppose that, when consuming access permissions, one has to upgrade or downgrade r of them. Then, comp(consume) = r + (m + 1) + 1, and
where Body is the body of the method (see Rule R MDEF ). On the other hand,
-Constructor. With r and m as before, we have
Theorem 5.2 (Complexity) Let ∆ be a theory containing the definition clauses for method and constructor definitions, the definition of assg and the upgrade and downgrade axioms. Let F be the formula interpreting the main program and G be a formula interpreting a property to be proven. It is decidable whether or not the sequent ! ∆, F −→ G is provable. In fact, if such a sequent is provable, then its proof is bounded in ILLF by the depth comp(F ) + 1.
Proof
First of all, note that, since there are no circular recursive definitions (see Remark 2.1), methods are simply unfolded. Moreover, as carefully described above, the complexity of such method calls is taken into account in the complexity of the outer method definition
. This means that, whenever a method, constructor or an axiom is called in ∆ via F , its complexity is already computed in the complexity procedure we have just described. Due to the focusing discipline, proving a sequent in AP is equivalent to decomposing its formulas completely. Therefore, the complexity of the proof of the sequent ! ∆, F −→ G is completely determined by the complexity of decomposing F plus the final focusing in G, which is a purely positive formula.
Alcove Prover and Verification of Properties
In the following, we explain our verification technique for three different kind of properties: deadlock detection; the ability of methods to run concurrently; and correctness (whether programs adhere to their specifications or not). Recall, from Example 4.4, that we have added to the predicates act(·), run(·), end(·) extra parameters to signalize the variable that called the method, the name of the method and the number of line of the source program. Then, for instance, in Example 5.1, the definition of the constructor looks like l, z) and the encoding of, e.g, line 10 in Figure 1 , is collection collection(x, z, 10). Deadlock Detection. Consider Example 4.5. We already showed that this code leads to a deadlock since s cannot upgrade its unique permission to execute c.compStats(s). We are then interested in providing a proof to the programmer showing that the code leads to a deadlock. , we know that, for some z and c, end(c, collection compStats , 15, z) will be added to the store only when the statement c.compStats(svar) (in line 15) is successfully executed. The translation of this program will give rise to the theory ∆ and the formula F described in Example 5.1. The verification technique consists in showing that the sequent ! ∆, F −→ ∃z, c.end(c, collection compStats , 15, z) ⊗ is not provable. This verification is done automatically by using Alcove-Prover, a theorem prover for ILLF developed in Teyjus and integrated to the tool described in Section 4.3. Basically, we look for proofs with depth less or equal to 38, given by the depth of F . In this case, the prover fails, thus showing that the process S [[st] ] z cannot reach a store entailing the constraint ∃z, c.end (c, collection compStats , 15, z) .
The URL of the Alcove tool includes the output of the theorem prover and the lcc interpreter for this example. It is worth noticing that the lcc interpreter only computes a possible trace of the program while the theorem prover is able to check all the reachable configurations for the same program. The Alcove prover is completely faithful to the ILLF fragment presented in Section 5.3.
The use of "animators" and provers is complementary. Existing formal models for system construction, such as the Rodin ( (Abrial et al. 2010) ) tool for the event B modeling language, usually include both. The idea is that by using the animator the user gain a global understanding of the behavior of the program before attempting the proof of more precise desirable properties. This usually avoids frustrations in trying to figure out corrections of the model to discharge unproved properties.
Concurrency Analysis. Consider the following lcc agents
These processes represent an abstraction of the encoding of two statements s 1 and s 2 such that s 2 must wait until s 1 releases the program control by adding sync(z 1 ). It is easy to see that from the initial configuration γ = ∅; P Q; 1 we always end up in the final configuration γ = ∅; ∅; ! end(z 1 ) ⊗ ! end(z 2 ) showing that both s 1 and s 2 were successfully executed. Nevertheless, depending on the scheduler, we may observe different intermediate configurations. For instance, if all the processes in P are first selected for execution, we shall observe the derivation:
On the other side, an interleaved execution of P and Q may be
. Unlike the first derivation, in the second one we were able to observe the store run(z 1 ) ⊗ run(z 2 ) representing the fact that both s 1 and s 2 were executed concurrently.
From the point of view of the lcc interpreter, the two derivations above are admissible. This means that the fact of not observing in a trace the concurrent execution of two statements does not imply that they have to be sequentialized due to the AP dependencies.
We can rely on the logical view of processes to verify whether it is possible for two statements to run concurrently. For instance, consider the Example 4.4 and let F be the resulting ILL formula. The following sequent turns out to be provable: ! ∆, F −→ ∃z 1 , z 2 , c, s(run(c, collection print , 13, z 1 )⊗ run(c, collection compStats , 14, z 2 )) ⊗ while the following one is not: This method requires that the unique permission to the caller must be restored to the environment. Nevertheless, the implementation of the method splits the unique permission into two share permissions, one for the field a and another for the caller (Rule R ALIAS ). Then, the axiom upgrade 1 cannot be used to recover the unique permission and the ask agent in definition r env remains blocked. An analysis similar to that of deadlocks will warn the programmer about this. In general, what we need is to prove sequents of the shape ! ∆, Γ −→ ∃c, z, l.end(c, method , l, z) ⊗ where Γ contains an atomic formula needed to start the execution of the method (i.e., a formula of the shape c method(x, · · · )) and also the atomic formulas guaranteeing that the method can be executed (ref (x, o, unq, ndg) , ct(o, s(0)) for the method mistake). This can be done, for instance, by letting Γ = L[[S [[st] ]]] where st is a dummy main program that creates an instance of collection and then calls the method mistake. In this case, the prover answers negatively to the query ! ∆, L[[S [[st] ]]] −→ ∃c, z, l.end(c, collection mistake , l, z) ⊗ , showing that, even satisfying the preconditions of the method mistake , it cannot finish its execution.
Applications
In this section we present two compelling examples of the use of our verification techniques. One is the well-known mutual exclusion problem where two (or more) processes compete for access to a critical section. In our example there are two critical sections with exclusive access. The other models a producer and a consumer processes concurrently updating a data structure.
Two Critical Zones Management System
Assume the class definitions for a two critical zones management system in Figure 17 . There are three classes, lock (line 1), process (line 4) and cs (line 7). Each critical section has a private lock managed by an object of the class cs. When a process wants to enter the critical section i ∈ {1, 2}, it tries first to invoke the method acqi (lines 11 and 15) of the cs manager. If successful, the process obtains a lock (i.e. an object of class Method acqi has three parameters: this (i.e., the cs manager), b the process wanting to enter the critical zone and l, a field of b that will hold the lock of the cs supplied by the manager. Since this has unique permission, only one reference to the manager object can exist for acqi to be invoked. The body of method acqi stores the lock in l and a reference to the manager in field cs1 or cs2 of b, depending on whether the lock for cs1 or for cs2 is requested. Storing this reference to the manager implies that it cannot longer have unique permission, so the output permission for this becomes shared. Moreover, l holds now the only reference to the private lock of the manager, so its output permission becomes unique. The effect is that field lock1 or lock2 of object b uniquely acquires the section lock. The method enter (line 3) requires a unique permission on the lock. This ensures that only one process has a reference to the lock at any given time when entering the critical section. The method releasei restores conditions as they were before invocation to acqi, i.e. the manager regains the unique permission and stores a unique reference to its private lock. Process object fields loose the lock and the reference to the manager.
Assume now the main code in Figure 18 (a) where there are two section manager objects cs1 and cs2. There are also two processes, p1 and p2. Consider the situation where p1 acquires the lock from cs1 (line 9) and enters (line 10). Then p2 acquires the lock from cs2 and enters (line 11-12). Now, p2 tries to acquire the lock from cs2 (line 13), but this is not possible because cs1 has no longer a unique permission and execution blocks. Alcove reports this situation: Consider now the program in Figure 18 (b) where processes leave the critical section before attempting to acquire another lock. In this case, all invocations run without blockage and Alcove successfully finishes the analysis:
1 ... 2 ended(X_6152,cs_release1,line_113 (Z_PAR_24136)) 3 ended(W_7153,cs_release2,line_114 (Z_PAR_25137)) 4 ok() 5 3517 processes Created Figure 19 shows the class definitions for a producer-consumer system working concurrently over a buffer. Class buffer (line 1) represents the data structure with operations for reading (line 3), writing (line 4) and removing the content of the buffer (line 5). Class producerConsummer (line 14) provides methods for adding (produce) -line 19-and remove (consume) -line 24-elements from the data structure. Since these could be invoked concurrently, the class implements a critical section (line 8) representing access to the element of the data structure the consumer or producer is working on. That is, producing or consuming could in principle be simultaneous over different elements of the structure. To keep the example simple, we assume a single critical section over the whole data structure.
Concurrent Producer-Consumer System
Class producerConsumer defines a group g for processes operating over the data structure (line 14). The group is used to manage permissions of all processes invoking methods of the class. Since callers of produce and consume both have share group permissions on g, they can be invoked concurrently. This can be seen in the main program (line 30). Variable P C has unique permission over the producerConsumer object. This unique permission is split (line 36) into share permissions for the group to allow producer and consumer calls to run in parallel. Note, however, that simultaneous access to the buffer is precluded by the need for each process to acquire the lock before (lines 20 and 25).
As shown, in the excerpt of the Alcove's output in Figure 20 , the call to consume (line 4) is done while produce is still running (line 2). Note also that before executing write (line 11), the method produce has to acquire the lock on the data structure (lines 5 and 9). Similarly, the execution of read (line 23) (called by the consumer in line 20) has to wait until the lock is released by the consumer (line 17) and acquired by the producer (lines 18 and 21).
AP based languages like AEminium (Stork et al. 2009 ) provides abstractions to simplify the (concurrent) access to share objects. For instance, in the example above, we locked the buffer before executing the methods write and read (lines 21 and 26 in Figure 19 ). In AEminium, it suffices to wrap the call to these methods into a atomic block of the form: atomic<g>{ B.write() } The AEminium runtime system guarantees that the execution of write on the object pointed by B is isolated, i.e., other methods invoked on the same object must wait until the termi- nation of write. We note that the behavior of atomic blocks relies completely on the runtime system. Since we are interested in the static analysis of AP programs, we did not considered atomic blocks in the grammar of Figure 3 . Note also that what we can analyze statically is whether methods produce (line 19) and consume (line 24) can acquire a share permission on the buffer B.
Concluding Remarks
We presented an approach based on lcc for specifying and verifying programs annotated with access permissions. Program statements are modeled as lcc agents that faithfully represent the statement permissions flow. The declarative reading of lcc agents as formulas in intuitionistic linear logic permits verifying properties such as deadlocks, the admissibility of parallel executions, and whether methods are correct w.r.t. their AP specifications. Central to our verification approach is the synchronization mechanism based on constraints, combined with the logical interpretation of lcc into the focused system ILLF.
A good strategy for understanding the behavior of a concurrent program is running a simulator able to observe the evolution of its processes, hence having a better glance of the global program behavior. Then, a prover able to verify formally various properties can be executed. For this reason, we have automated our specification and verification approach as the Alcove tool. Using this tool we were able, for instance, to verify the critical zone management system and the producer-consumer system presented in Section 6. The reader can find these and other examples at the Alcove tool web-site. The results and techniques presented here are certainly a novel application for ccp, and they will open a new window for the automatic verification of (object-oriented) concurrent programs.
Related and Future work. ccp-based calculi have been extensively used to reason about concurrent systems in different scenarios such as system biology, security protocols, mul-timedia interaction systems, just to name a few. The reader may find in (Olarte et al. 2013) a survey of models and applications of ccp. A work related to ours is (Jagadeesan et al. 2005) , where the authors propose a timed-ccp model for role-based access control in distributed systems. The authors combine constraint reasoning and temporal logic modelchecking to verify when a resource (e.g. a directory in a file system) can be accessed. We should also mention the work in (Nigam 2012) where linear authorization logics are used to specify access control policies that may mention the affirmations, possessions and knowledge of principals. In the above mentioned works, access policies are used to control and restrict the use of resources in a distributed environment but they do not deal with the verification of a (concurrent) programming language.
Languages like AEminium (Stork et al. 2009 ) and Plaid (Sunshine et al. 2011 ) offer a series of guarantees such as (1) absence of AP usage protocol violation at run time; (2) when a program has deterministic results and (3) whether programs are free of race conditions on the abstract state of the objects (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007; Boyland 2003) . Roughly, type-checking rules generate the needed information to build the graph of dependencies among the statements in the program. Such annotations are then used by the runtime environment to determine the pieces of code that can be executed in parallel (Stork et al. 2014) . Well typed programs are free of race condition by either enforcing synchronization when accessing shared data or by correctly computing dependencies. However, well typed programs are not necessarily deadlock free. Hence, our developments are complementary to those works and provide additional reasoning techniques for AP programs.
Somewhat surprisingly, even though in (Stork et al. 2014) it is mentioned that "access permissions follow the rules of linear logic", the authors did not go further on this idea. Our linear logic encodings can be seen as the first logic semantics for AP. As showed in this paper, such declarative reading of AP allows to perform interesting static analyses on AP based programs.
The constraint system we propose to model the downgrade and upgrade of axioms was inspired by the work of fractional permissions in (Boyland 2003 ) (see also (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007) ). Fractional in this setting means that an AP can be split into several more relaxed permissions and then joined back to form a more restrictive permission. For instance, a unique permission can be split into two share permissions of weight k/2. Therefore, to recover a unique permission, it is necessary to have two k/2-share permissions. The constraint system described in this paper keeps explicitly the information about the fractions by using the predicate ct(·).
Chalice (Leino 2010 ) is a program verifier for OO concurrent programs that uses permissions to control memory accesses. Unlike AEminium and Plaid, concurrency in Chalice is explicitly stated by the user by means of execution threads.
The language Rust (https://www.rust-lang.org/) provides mechanisms to avoid data races. These do not use APs but rely on types. Type mut (mutable) works similarly as a unq permission. A data structure defined with type mut is claimed ownership by the first thread using it, so it cannot be taken concurrently by another thread. The compiler checks this statically. Type Arc allows the data structure to be shared among threads, but then it cannot be a mutable structure. This is then similar to imm permissions. Type Arc can be combined with mutex to have a mutable structure that can be shared. A lock mechanism is available for the user to control simultaneous accesses. As opposed to permissions, however, there is no upgrading/downgrading of types. Hence, AP and DGAP provide, in principle, more flexible mechanisms to express concurrent behaviors. In (Ullrich 2016) a translation of Rust programs into the Lean prover to verify program correctness is described. As far as we know, however, no verification of the kind we presented here is available for Rust.
AP annotations in concurrent-by-default OO languages can be enhanced with the notion of typestates (Bierhoff and Aldrich 2007; Beckman et al. 2008) . Typestates describe abstract states in the form of state-machines, thus defining a usage protocol (or contract) of objects. For instance, consider the class File with states opened and closed. The signature of the method open can be specified as the agent unq(this) ⊗ closed(this) → unq(this) ⊗ opened(this). The general idea is to verify whether a program follows correctly the usage protocol defined by the class. For example, calling the method read on a closed file leads to an error. Typestates then impose certain order in which methods can be called. The approach our paper defines can be extended to deal with typestates annotations, thus widening its applicability.
The work in (Naden et al. 2012 ) defines more specific systems and rules for access permissions to provide for borrowing permissions. This approach aims at dealing more effectively with local variable aliasing, and with how permissions flow from the environment to method formal parameters. Considering these systems in Alcove amounts to refine our model of permissions in Section 4. Verification techniques should remain the same.
